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NOTES
ABANDONMENT RIGHTS UNDER SECTION

554(a) OF

THE BANKRUPTCY CODE:
MIDLANTIC NA TIONAL BANK v. NEW
JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
UANTA Resources Corporation operated waste oil processing and
storage facilities in Long Island City, New York, and in Edgewater,
New Jersey.1 In June 1981 Midlantic National Bank loaned Quanta
$600,000 secured by Quanta's inventory, its accounts receivable, and certain
equipment. That same month the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) sampled the waste oil at the Edgewater site. The
samples indicated that the oil contained levels of PCBs2 in excess of the
levels permitted under Quanta's temporary operating authorization. 3 Consequently, NJDEP ordered Quanta to close the Edgewater site and began
negotiating with Quanta concerning the cleanup of the site. Before NJDEP
and Quanta completed the negotiations, however, Quanta filed a petition for
reorganization under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.4 The next day
NJDEP issued an administrative order requiring Quanta to clean up the site.
Subsequently, an investigation of the New York facility revealed that Quanta
had stored over 70,000 gallons of PCB-contaminated oil in deteriorating
containers there.
On November 12, 1981, Quanta moved to have its chapter 11 proceedings
converted into a liquidation proceeding under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
1.
2.
3.
4.

Quanta owned the New York facility, but leased the New Jersey site.
PCBs, polychlorinated biphenyls, are highly toxic carcinogens.
NJDEP issued the temporary operating permit.
The Bankruptcy Code is codified as title 11 of the United States Code. Under chapter

11 a debtor can voluntarily file a plan to negotiate with creditors for an out-of-court debt

restructuring. The debtor remains in possession of its property and conducts its business as a

debtor in possession, unless the bankruptcy court, after notice and hearing, finds cause for the
1100.01 (L. King 15th ed. 1986)
appointment of a trustee. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
[hereinafter COLLIER]. Liquidation of assets may be accomplished under chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4) (1982). That chapter, however, is designed primarily for rehabilitation. D. COWANS, COWANs BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 20.1, at
246 (1986).
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Code.5 The court appointed a liquidation trustee. 6 The trustee tried to sell
the New York facility, but since the mortgages on the real property at the
New York site exceeded the property's value, and the cost of cleaning up the
toxic waste was estimated to be well over $1 million, the trustee could not
find a buyer. On May 25, 1982, at the trustee's request, the clerk of the
bankruptcy court issued a notice of proposed abandonment that was mailed
to all Quanta's creditors. The city and state of New York opposed the abandonment on the basis that abandonment would threaten public health and
safety, and would violate state environmental law. 7 The parties did not,
however, dispute that the site was burdensome and of inconsequential value
to the estate8 within the meaning of the abandonment provision, section 554,
of the Bankruptcy Code. 9 The Bankruptcy Court for the District of New
Jersey approved the abandonment of the New York facility.10 The District
Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed,1 1 and the city and state of
New York appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.1 2
Meanwhile, the Quanta trustee petitioned to abandon the New Jersey
property. NJDEP objected to the proposed abandonment 1 3 on the basis that
the estate had sufficient funds to protect the public from the danger of the
toxic waste. This argument did not persuade the bankruptcy court, which
on May 20, 1983, issued an order authorizing the trustee to abandon the
personal property at the Edgewater, New Jersey, site.14 Since the issue was
5. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(a) (1982) authorizes a debtor in possession to convert a chapter 11
case to a chapter 7 case.
6. After the commencement of a voluntary case the court immediately appoints an interim trustee, and the creditors subsequently elect a trustee under § 702. Id. § 702. If the
creditors do not elect under § 702, the interim trustee serves as trustee. Id. § 702(d). The
trustee's duties are enumerated in § 704 of the Bankruptcy Code. The trustee must reduce the
assets of the bankrupt estate to cash for distribution to the creditors as expeditiously as is
prudent. Id. § 704. This duty to close the estate is also required by implication from the
Bankruptcy Rules. See FED. BANKR. R. 1001. Several courts have held that the trustee's
main duty consists of the liquidation of assets. See Pueblo Sav. & Trust Co. v. Power (In re
Power), 115 F.2d 69, 72 (7th Cir. 1940); Bunch v. Maloney, 233 F. 967, 969 (8th Cir. 1916),
rev'd on other grounds, 246 U.S. 658 (1917); Trice v. Coolidge Banking Co., 242 F. 175, 176
(S.D. Ga. 1917); Gardner v. Rich Mfg. Co., 68 Cal. App. 2d 725, 158 P.2d 23, 29 (1945).
7. The New York Environmental Conservation Law makes it unlawful to dispose knowingly of more than 1500 gallons of hazardous waste without authorization from state authorities. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-2713(7) (McKinney 1984).
8. An estate is created by commencement of a bankruptcy case and is comprised of all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982).
9. Id. § 554(a) provides that a trustee may, after notice and hearing, abandon property
that is burdensome or of inconsequential value to the estate.
10. New York v. O'Neill (In re Quanta Resources), No. 81-05967 (Bankr. D.N.J. June 22,
1982), reprintedin Petition for Certiorari at 69a, Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of
Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755, 88 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1986) (No. 84-805) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Briefs file).
11. New York v. O'Neill (In re Quanta Resources Corp.), 55 Bankr. 696, 697 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1983).
12. City of New York v. Quanta Resources Corp. (In re Quanta Resources Corp.), 739
F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984).
13. The New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:1023.1 lb(h) (West 1982), prohibits intentional or unintentional releasing, spilling, or leaking of
hazardous substances that may drain into state waters.
14. Order Authorizing Abandonment of Property, In re Quanta Resources, No. 81-05967
(Bankr. D.N.J. May 20, 1983), reprintedin Petition for Certiorari at 64a, Midlantic Nat'l Bank
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already pending before the Third Circuit in the context of the abandonment16
5
of the New York site, NJDEP appealed directly to the Third Circuit.
The court of appeals did not hear any arguments in the case concerning the
New Jersey property. The court reversed the decisions of the bankruptcy
and district courts and held, in a split decision, that the trustee's power to
abandon burdensome or inconsequential property of the estate under section
554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code did not supersede state and local laws
designed to protect the public health and safety.' 7 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and consolidated the two cases.' 8 Held, affirmed: A
trustee cannot abandon property under section 554(a) when doing so would
contravene state or local laws designed to protect public health and safety.
Midlantic NationalBank v. New Jersey Department ofEnvironmental Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755, 88 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1986).

I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABANDONMENT POWER IN SECTION

A.

554(a)

Effect of Abandonment

The 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act codified the judicially created power of
abandonment.' 9 This legislation authorizes a trustee in bankruptcy to abandon property that is of inconsequential value to the estate. 20 Under the statutory rule control of the property reverts back to the debtor such that the
debtor is treated as having owned it continuously. 2 ' Thus, the estate is free
of expenses of burdensome property. Statutory abandonment, therefore, furthers the purpose of bankruptcy liquidation because abandonment helps the
trustee expeditiously to secure funds for distribution to the general creditors
22
of the estate.
The statutory rule of abandonment stems from the common law. 23 The
common law rule empowered a bankruptcy trustee to petition the court for
leave to abandon an asset that, in the trustee's judgment, would burden
v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755, 88 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1986) (No. 84-805)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
15. Direct appeal is allowed under 28 U.S.C. § 1293(b) (1982).
16. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 927 (3d Cir. 1984).
17. The court of appeals balanced the policies of the state law and federal bankruptcy law
in holding that the trustee could not abandon the site. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d
at 929; City of New York v. Quanta Resources Corp. (In re Quanta Resources Corp.), 739
F.2d at 923.
18. Consolidation was authorized by Sup. Cr. R. 19-4 because the two cases involved
identical questions.
19. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982).
20. Id.; see supra note 9.
21. Mason v. Commissioner, 646 F.2d 1309, 1310 (9th Cir. 1980).
22. 5 COLLIER, supra note 4, 554.01.
23. See First Nat'l Bank v. Lasater, 196 U.S. 115, 118 (1905); Dushane v. Beall, 161 U.S.
513, 515 (1896); American File Co. v. Garrett, 110 U.S. 288, 295 (1884); Cleveland Terminals
Bldg., 118 F.2d 89, 94 (6th Cir. 1941); Federal Land Bank v. Nalder, 116 F.2d 1004, 1007
(10th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 578 (1941); Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Logan, 92 F.2d
28, 31 (5th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 763, 303 U.S. 636 (1938); Central States Life Ins.
Co. v. Koplar Co., 80 F.2d 754, 757-58 (8th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 687 (1936);
Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Scales, 62 F.2d 582, 585 (5th Cir. 1933); Quinn v. Gardner, 32
F.2d 772, 773 (8th Cir. 1929).
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rather than benefit the estate. 24 The rule developed because the practice of
abandoning worthless or burdensome property furthered the paramount
purpose of bankruptcy liquidation: the expeditious reduction of the debtor's
property to money for distribution to general creditors. 25 The courts recognized that forcing a trustee to retain such property would frustrate the purpose of the liquidation. 26 Since the trustee took title to the debtor's property
under the Bankruptcy Act in force at the time the abandonment concept
developed, 27 common law abandonment divested the trustee of title and re28
vested title in the debtor.
B.

Common Law Restrictions on Abandonment

Although prior to the current Bankruptcy Code courts normally would
not deny a petition to abandon, 29 the courts did impose limitations on the
power of abandonment. 30 In deciding In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co. 3 1 in

1942, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit carved out an exception
to the power of abandonment for the operation of a railroad line. 32 In that
case the debtor, Chicago Rapid Transit, was a public transportation utility
company operating in Chicago. During the reorganization proceedings the
trustee wanted to abandon a leased branch rail line. The estate was running
the branch line at a deficit and was far behind in rental payments due the
lessor, but the Illinois Commerce Commission forbade the abandonment of
the line.3 3 The court decided that bankruptcy courts could not empower a

trustee to abandon property when a state utility commission and public convenience and necessity required otherwise.3 4 Although the court required
the estate to continue operation of the line in compliance with state law, the
court did authorize the estate to reject the lease. 35 The trustee, therefore,
24. Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d 289, 290 (4th Cir. 1952). The rule developed by
analogy to provisions of the former Bankruptcy Act. See 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(4) (1970) (repealed 1978 and recodified as 11 U.S.C. § 505(b) (1982)), § 110(a)(2) (1970) (repealed 1978),
§ 110(b) (repealed 1978 and recodified as 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982)) (contemplating abandonment of property burdened by taxes, patents and trademarks, and leases, respectively).
25. 4 COLLIER, supra note 4, 554.01.
26. Id.
27. 11 U.S.C. § I10(a) (1970) (repealed 1978).
28. 4 COLLIER, supra note 4, 554.02[2].
29. First Nat'l Bank v. Lasater, 196 U.S. 115, 118 (1905); Dushane v. Beall, 161 U.S. 513,
513 (1896); Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d 289, 290 (4th Cir. 1952); Lincoln Nat'l Life
Ins. Co. v. Scales, 62 F.2d 582, 585 (5th Cir. 1933).
30. E.g., Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d 289, 290 (4th Cir. 1952) (restriction on abandoning barges); In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 683 (1942) (restriction on abandoning railroad line); In re Lewis Jones, Inc., [1973-1975
Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 65,471 (Bankr. D. Pa. Nov. 7, 1974) (restriction on
abandoning underground steam lines that pose a public hazard).
31. 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 683 (1942).
32. 129 F.2d at 5.
33. The debtor was a railroad corporation engaged in transportation of passengers in intrastate commerce as a public utility in Illinois and was, therefore, subject to the regulatory
jurisdiction of the Illinois Commerce Commission, which directed the trustees to continue to
operate the line.
34. 129 F.2d at 5.
35. Id.
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although required to operate the property, was free of the obligation to pay
rent. The decision thus protected the estate, but ensured compliance with
state law.
Chicago Rapid Transit, however, was decided in the context of a reorganization proceeding, not a liquidation proceeding. In a reorganization proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code the trustee must operate the property
according to the valid laws of the state. 36 This principle does not apply to a
liquidation proceeding, because during liquidation the trustee is liquidating,
not operating, the estate. Furthermore, Chicago Rapid Transit did stress the
supremacy of the federal bankruptcy law over state laws, 37 but because the
case was decided prior to the codification of the abandonment power, a federal, legislative abandonment rule did not exist to override the state law.
A decade later a Fourth Circuit decision further restricted the power of
abandonment. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker 3s the Fourth Circuit decided
that the judicially created abandonment rule would yield when it conflicted
39
with a federal statute enacted to ensure the safety of navigation. Ottenheimer involved a trustee who sought to abandon worthless floating
barges. The harbor engineer of the city of Baltimore successfully opposed
the trustee on the grounds that the proposed abandonment would obstruct
navigable waters in violation of a federal statute. 4° The penalty under the
statute was a fine, imprisonment, or both.4 ' The court based its decision not
to allow abandonment on the fact that the abandonment rule was not provided by statute, but rather was judicially created. 42 The court did not think
it could extend such a judicially created rule to a situation that would cause
an unjust result. 43 If the court had allowed the trustee to abandon the
barges, the ownership would have revested in the debtor, who would then
have been subject to the penalty under the federal statute. The court did
note, however, that it would have applied the abandonment rule had it not
been for the consequences to the debtor."
The 1974 decision In re Lewis Jones, Inc.45 is a more recent case that
restricted the common law right to abandon. In an advisory opinion the
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania concluded that a
trustee must seal underground steam lines prior to abandonment so as to
prevent a hazard to the public. 46 The estate had sufficient resources to fill in
and seal the steam lines; therefore, the court advised the trustees to file an
36. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1982).
37.
tion by
38.
39.
40.
vessels
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
1974).
46.

129 F.2d at 4. The court stated: "[Bankruptcy law] when given expression in legislaCongress, is paramount and transcends and supersedes all inconsistent state laws." Id.
198 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1952).
Id. at 290.
33 U.S.C. § 409 (1982) provided that it was unlawful to permit or voluntarily cause
to sink in navigable waters.
Id. § 411.
198 F.2d at 290.
Id.
Id.
[1973-1975 Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 65,471 (Bankr. D. Pa. Nov. 7,
Id. If steam lines are left unsealed they pose a danger to public health and safety.
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application seeking authorization to expend the necessary amounts to fill
and seal the lines before applying for leave to abandon the property.47 The
scope of the Lewis Jones holding was rather narrow for two reasons. First,
the decision was an advisory opinion, and second, the decision did not
squarely address the issue of whether the abandonment rule should yield to
state and local laws designed to protect public health and safety.
II.

MIDLANTIC NATIONAL BANK v NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

A.

Defining the Issue

When Congress enacted section 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code it did not
codify any restrictions on the power of abandonment. Midlantic presented
the first opportunity for the Supreme Court 48 to define the parameters of the
section. 49 The central issue in Midlantic was whether section 554(a) of the

federal Bankruptcy Code preempted state laws designed to protect public
health and safety. Essentially this issue was a matter of statutory construction.50 Justice Powell based his majority opinion on three premises:
(1) common law restrictions on abandonment; 5 1 (2) restrictions on abandonment found in other statutory provisions; 52 and (3) Congress's concern over
the risks of improper storage and disposal of hazardous and toxic substances. 53 The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist and joined
47. Id.
48. Lower courts had held that § 554(a) contained an explicit public policy exception. See
In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 927, 929 (3d Cir. 1984) (applied balancing test comparing public risk to advantages to trustee and creditors); In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45
Bankr. 278, 284 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985). For a more extreme approach see In re Charles
George Land Reclamation Trust, 30 Bankr. 918, 919 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983) (bankruptcy
petition dismissed for fear that owner of waste site would take shelter behind automatic stay
and abandonment provisions and thereby avoid cleanup costs). Contra In re Stevens, 53
Bankr. 783, 787-88 (Bankr. D. Me. 1985) (trustee may abandon property containing hazardous waste; trustee not limited by 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1982)); In re A&T Trailer Park, Inc., 53
Bank. 144, 147 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985) (trustee may abandon property without compliance
with state environmental laws); In re Catamount Dyers, Inc., 50 Bankr. 790, 791-94 (Bankr.
D. Vt. 1985) (liquidating trustee may abandon hazardous waste material; Congress did not
create hazardous waste exception to § 554(a); and because trustee is liquidating rather than
managing property, 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1982), which requires compliance with state law, see
supra text accompanying note 36, does not apply).
49. For background discussion see Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation:
VII Bankruptcy and Insurance Issues, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1585-601 (1986); Note, Cleaning Up in Bankruptcy: Curbing Abuse of the Federal Bankruptcy Code by Industrial Polluters,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 870, 879-83 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Cleaning Up]; Note, Belly Up Down
in the Dumps: Bankruptcy and Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1037, 1041-63
(1985) [hereinafter Note, Belly Up].
50. The language of § 554(a) is unconditional. See supra note 9. If the abandonment
power were intended to be absolute, then any implied exceptions in favor of public health and
safety would be impermissible.
51. See supra notes 29-47 and accompanying text.
52. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982) (automatic stay provision in Bankruptcy
Code, which allows a bankruptcy petition to stay legal proceedings against a debtor, restricted
to allow government to commence or continue legal proceedings to protect public health and
safety); 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1982) (trustee must manage and operate property in his possession
in compliance with state laws).
53. The legislative history of § 554(a) is brief and unhelpful. The Court, therefore, did not
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by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and O'Connor, strongly disputed
each of these three premises.
B.

Relevancy of Common Law Restrictions and Statutory Construction

The majority stated that together the restrictions in Ottenheimer,Chicago
Rapid Transit, and Lewis Jones constituted a judicial doctrine designed to
restrict the common law abandonment power when necessary to protect legitimate state or federal interests. 54 The Court reasoned that the Bankruptcy Code was meant to encompass this judicial doctrine55 and that the
doctrine would prevent abandonment of contaminated property. 56 In support of this analysis the Court stressed that accepted rules of statutory construction dictate that Congress, when it codifies a judicial doctrine such as
the power of abandonment, must expressly state its intention to change the
interpretation of the judicially created concept. 5 7 The Court argued that
under this rule of construction the Bankruptcy Code abandonment power
was subject to the common law doctrine derived from Ottenheimer, Chicago
Rapid Transit, and Lewis Jones as the Code did not clearly indicate otherwise. 58 The majority recognized that the restrictions in Ottenheimer, Chicago Rapid Transit, and Lewis Jones did not encompass the precise factual
issue involved in Midlantic.5 9 Justice Powell emphasized, however, that the
three cases represented an established doctrine that prohibited abandonment
that would cause a violation of state and federal laws designed to protect
legitimate interests. 60 The doctrine was not designed to prevent abandonment only in fact situations directly parallel to the facts of Ottenheimer,Chi61
cago Rapid Transit, or Lewis Jones.
As further support for its position the majority referred to another rule of
statutory construction. Specifically, the Court stated that if Congress, in
drafting bankruptcy laws, desires to grant the trustee exemptions from
nonbankruptcy laws, it must clearly express that intent. 62 The Court conrely heavily upon it. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 92, reprintedin 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5878; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 377,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6333; 124 CONG. REC. 32,401
(1978).

54. Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 759, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 865.
55. Id. at 759-60, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 865-66. The Court stated that in codifying the judicially
created power of abandonment Congress also intended to include the established exception
that a trustee could not abandon property in violation of certain state and federal laws. Id.
56. Id. at 762, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 869.
57. Id. at 759-60, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 865-66. The majority based this analysis on Edmonds v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 266-67 (1979). The Court in Edmonds
concluded that because the legislature was silent as to the effect of prior case law, the legislation did not alter the cases' effect. Id.
58. 106 S. Ct. at 760, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 866.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. The majority stated, "[a]lthough these cases do not define for us the exact contours
of the trustee's abandonment power, they do make clear that this power was subject to certain
restrictions when Congress enacted § 554(a)." Id.
62. Id. (citing Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 85 (1939); Swarts v. Hammer, 194
U.S. 441, 444 (1904)).

1110

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

(Vol. 40

cluded, therefore, that since Congress did not expressly grant an exemption
from state environmental laws, the trustee in Midlantic could not abandon
63
contaminated property in violation of state environmental laws.
C. Analogy to Other Bankruptcy Cases and Code Sections
The Court next turned to other sections of the Bankruptcy Code and the
case law interpreting those sections to determine further the scope of the
Bankruptcy Code abandonment power. Justice Powell interpreted the recent case of Ohio v. Kovacs 64 to require a bankruptcy trustee to comply with
state environmental laws prior to abandonment. 65 After a brief discussion of
67
Kovacs 6 6 the Court went on to examine NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco.
Bildisco interpreted the provision of the Bankruptcy Code that allows a
trustee to reject an executory contract when the agreement burdens the estate. 68 The majority in Midlantic cited Bildisco for the proposition that a
69
trustee cannot ignore nonbankruptcy law.
63. Id.
64. 104 S. Ct. 705, 83 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1985). In Kovacs the State of Ohio sought compen-

sation for clean up of the toxic waste site of a bankrupt corporation. The Kovacs Court concluded that
[they did] not question that anyone in possession of the site--whether it is [the
debtor] or another in the event the receivership is liquidated and the trustee
abandons the property, or a vendee from the receiver or the bankruptcy
trustee-must comply with the environmental laws of the State of Ohio.
Plainly, that person or firm may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of
the State, or refuse to remove the source of such conditions.
Id. at 711-12, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 659. Although Midlantic cites Kovacs in support of its position,
the above quoted statement from Kovacs could imply that a bankruptcy trustee can abandon
property littered with toxic waste. See Comment, Kovacs and Toxic Wastes in Bankruptcy, 36
STAN. L. REV. 1199 (1984).

65. Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 760, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 866.
66. The majority's brief discussion of Kovacs is misleading. Kovacs addressed the question
of whether a debtor's obligation under an environmental consent order constitutes a debt dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1982) in a personal bankruptcy proceeding. The Court
held that an environmental order that is primarily a request for money is dischargeable. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. at 711, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 658. Kovacs, however, did not address the question of
whether an environmental order is subject to the automatic stay provisions of § 362(a). See
infra notes 70-81 and accompanying text. Kovacs, therefore, contrary to the majority's reading, did not imply that contaminated property could not be abandoned.
67. 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
68. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982).
69. Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 760, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 866. The Court relied on a passage from
Bildisco that read "[lt]he debtor in possession is not relieved of all obligations under the [National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)] simply by filing a petition for bankruptcy." Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 534. Although this excerpt seems to suggest that Bildisco
supports Midlantic, the holding in Bildisco suggests otherwise. The holding was twofold.
First, the Court held that the language "executory contract" in § 365(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code includes collective bargaining agreements subject to the National Labor Relations Act
and, therefore, the bankruptcy court should permit rejection of such an agreement if the agreement burdens the estate. Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 513. Second, the Court held that if the debtor in
possession does reject such an agreement prior to court approval, he does not commit an unfair
labor practice. Id. The decision allowed a company to terminate a union agreement and continue to operate. Although this result met with public disapproval, it is an example of correct
statutory interpretation. Rather than misreading the statute, the Court left it up to Congress
to deal with the public dissatisfaction. Four months later Congress enacted an express provision allowing a trustee to reject union contracts, thereby evidencing the correct response to an
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The Court further stated that Congress, as well as the courts, have set
forth the principle that a trustee cannot always ignore nonbankruptcy
laws. 70 The Court supported this statement through a discussion of the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, which allows a bankruptcy
petition to stay legal proceedings against a debtor. 71 This provision, section
362 of the Bankruptcy Code, is very important in preserving a debtor's estate
because the automatic stay prevents the assets of the estate from being used
to pay fines, judgments, or settlements. 7 2 Congress enacted several categories of exceptions 7 3 to the automatic stay that allow the government to com74
mence or continue legal proceedings to protect public health and safety.
The Court argued, therefore, that similar exceptions to the abandonment
power existed. 75 The Court stated that although Congress codified exceptions to section 362 and did not codify exceptions in section 554, such an
action did not undermine the inference that Congress intended restrictions
to be read into section 554(a). 76 The Court explained that the reason the
exceptions were express in section 362 and implied in section 554 was because of the differences between the predecessors of the two sections. 77 Prior
unsavory result. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, § 541(a), 98 Stat. 333, 390-91 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1113); see Note, Rejection
of Collective BargainingAgreements in Bankruptcy: NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco and the
Legislative Response, 33 CATH. U.L. REV. 943, 949-61 (1984).
70. Midlantic, 106 S. Ct. at 760, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 866.

71. Id. at 760-61, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 866-68. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982) provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under
section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3)
of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of(1) the commencement or continuation ... of a judicial, administrative,
or other proceeding against the debtor...
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate,
of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate ....
In effect this provision protects the debtor from the commencement or continuation of lawsuits, including proceedings before the U.S. Tax Court, judgments, acts to obtain possession of
property of the estate, and other similar actions to collect money from the debtor. See Lockett,
Environmental Liability Enforcement and the Bankruptcy Act of 1978. A Study of H.R. 2767,
the "Superlien" Provision, 19 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 859, 870-76 (1984).
72. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 53, at 54-55, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
5840-41; H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 53, at 340, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 6296-97.
73. For example, § 362(b)(5) permits a governmental unit to enforce nonmonetary judgments against a debtor's estate. The Third Circuit has held that an injunction to backfill a
mine falls within the nonmonetary judgment exception to the automatic stay provision. Penn
Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 278-79 (3d Cir. 1984). In dictum
Ohio v. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. 705, 83 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1985), expressed support of Penn Terra. Id.
at 711 n.11, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 658 n.ll.
74. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 53, at 52, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
5838; H. R. REP. No. 595, supra note 53, at 343, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
6299-300. Actions to prevent or stop violations of environmental laws, including actions to fix
damages for those violations are specifically included. Id. The legislative history reveals, however, that Congress intended that courts construe express exceptions to the automatic stay
narrowly. See Note, Belly Up, supra note 49, at 1042-51.
75. 106 S. Ct. at 761, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 867.
76. Id., 88 L. Ed. 2d at 867-68.
77. Id.
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to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 some courts had expanded
the automatic stay permitted under the 1973 Bankruptcy Rules to preclude
states from enforcing antipollution laws.78 Although Congress further expanded the automatic stay provisions in the Bankruptcy Code, 79 it desired to
limit expressly this prior judicial expansion.80 Prior to the enactment of
section 554, however, firmly established case law existed defining the power
8
and scope of abandonment. '
The Court cited 28 U.S.C. section 959(b)8 2 as additional evidence that
Congress did not intend the Bankruptcy Code to preempt all state laws.8 3
This provision requires trustees, receivers, or debtors in possession to operate the bankruptcy estate according to the valid laws of the state in which
the property is situated.8 4 Although admitting that section 959(b) did not
directly apply to a chapter 7 liquidation proceeding, the Court analogized
that section 959(b) supported its conclusion that Congress intended some
85
state laws to continue to restrict the abandonment power.
In concluding its argument the Court noted Congress's concern for protecting the environment against toxic pollution.8 6 The Court found it unlikely that Congress would have implicitly overturned the common law
restrictions on the abandonment power given the many environmental laws
Congress has enacted.8 7 The congressional emphasis on protecting the environment provided the Court with support for restricting the abandonment
power to ensure compliance with state and federal laws designed to protect
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing 1 W. NORTON, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 20.03, at 5-6 (1981)).
80. See 106 S. Ct. at 761, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 867-68 (citing H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 53,
at 174-75, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6135-36).
81. See supra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
82. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1982) provides:
Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or manager
appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States, including a
debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in his possession as
such trustee, receiver or manager according to the requirements of the valid
laws of the State in which such property is situated, in the same manner that the
owner or possessor thereof would be bound to do if in possession thereof.
83. 106 S. Ct. at 761-62, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 868.
84. See supra note 82.
85. 106 S. Ct. at 761-62, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 868. The Court stated that although § 959(b) did
not apply to an abandonment under § 554(a) and, therefore, did not delimit the precise conditions on an abandonment, the section nevertheless supported the conclusion that Congress did
not intend the Bankruptcy Code to preempt all state laws that otherwise constrain the exercise
of a trustee's powers. Id.
86. Id. at 762, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 868-69. The Court cited both the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982) (regulating treatment, storage, and disposal
of hazardous wastes by monitoring wastes from creation until after permanent disposal and
authorizing government to take judicial or administrative action to prevent substantial endangerment to health or environment), and the Superfund amendment to the Act, Act of Aug. 23,
1983, Pub. L. No. 98-80, § 2(c)(2)(B), 97 Stat. 485 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 691 la) (establishing fund to finance cleanup of some sites with requirement that the fund be reimbursed by
responsible parties). 106 S. Ct. at 762, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 868-69.
87. 106 S. Ct. at 762, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 869. For a discussion of federal statutes concerning
toxic waste see Developments in the Law, supra note 49, at 1470-76; Note, The Inapplicability
of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution
Victim Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REV. 575, 594-98 (1983).
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public health and safety.8 8
D. Analysis of Dissenting Opinion
In dissent Justice Rehnquist expressed concern that the result of the majority opinion was unclear and unfounded.8 9 The dissent began its criticism
with an analysis of the function of abandonment, which is to aid the trustee
in its primary task of reducing the estate to money for the benefit of the
creditors. 90 Under the Bankruptcy Code control of property abandoned by
the trustee reverts to the debtor or goes to a person having a possessory
interest in the property. 9 1 Abandonment of a hazardous waste site, therefore, frees the estate and passes the burden of cleanup to the owner.9 2 By
preventing this transfer of the burden of cleanup, the majority, according to
93
Justice Rehnquist, contradicted the purpose of the abandonment power
94
and distorted the absolute language of section 554(a).
Concerning whether Congress intended the courts to read exceptions into
section 554(a), 95 the dissent reasoned that Congress knew how to make ex96
press exceptions and, thus, would have done so had that been their intent.
Furthermore, the dissent did not find convincing the argument that the legislative history of section 554(a) supported the majority's position, because
that history did not contain any specific language to that effect. 97 Justice
88.

106 S. Ct. at 762, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 869.

89. Id. at 763, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 869-70.
90. Id., 88 L. Ed. 2d at 870; see Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 227 (1930); 4
COLLIER, supra note 4,
554.01; 2 W. NORTON, supra note 79, § 39.01; supra note 22 and
accompanying text.

91. 4 COLLIER, supra note 4, 554.02. The trustee does not have title to the property
(former Bankruptcy Act vested trustee with title); upon abandonment trustee is simply
divested of control over the property. Id.
92. The Bankruptcy Code does not specify who takes the property, but the legislative
history suggests that the prior owner would take the property. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. at 711 n.12;
S. REP. No. 989, supra note 53, at 92, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5878; see
supra note 21 and accompanying text.
93. 106 S. Ct. at 763, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 870. The purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to
preserve assets for swift distribution to creditors. See supra notes 6 & 22 and accompanying
text. Preventing a trustee from abandoning burdensome property will impair this purpose. In
addition the majority failed to address the issue that the supremacy clause would seem to
mandate that any conflict between the Bankruptcy Code and state environmental laws be resolved in favor of the Bankruptcy Code. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
94. 106 S. Ct. at 763-64, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 870-71. As worded, § 554(a) is limited only by
consideration of the value of the property to the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982).
95. See supra note 53.
96. 106 S. Ct. at 764, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 871. The dissent referred to the automatic stay
provisions and exceptions of § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code as well as the qualified abandonment provision for railroad lines found in § 1170(a)(2). Id. at 764-66, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 871-73.
The existence of the Interstate Commerce Commission's control over railroads required express exceptions to railroad line abandonment. See 5 COLLIER, supra note 4, 1170.01; see
also NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522-23 (1984) ("Obviously, Congress knew
how to draft an exclusion ...

when it wanted to.").

97. 106 S. Ct. at 764, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 871. The dissent stated that the Court had been
reluctant to imply exceptions or limitations into an unqualified statute on the basis of legislative history, unless that legislative history clearly demonstrated Congress's intent to establish
limitations. Id. (citing Garcia v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 479, 83 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1984)). The
scant legislative history on point falls short of this standard. Id. The legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Code contains no statement to support the proposition that section 554 was in-
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Rehnquist also did not believe that Ottenheimer, Chicago Rapid Transit, and
Lewis Jones represented established exceptions to the judicially created abandonment power. 98 According to Justice Rehnquist, the majority misread
those cases. 99 The dissent summarily dismissed all three cases as factually
distinguishable from Midlantic and considered the cases rare deviations
from, rather than well-recognized restrictions on, the rule of abandonment. l°° The dissenting opinion also attacked the Court's argument concerning 28 U.S.C. section 959(b), which requires a trustee to operate

property in compliance with state laws.' 0 ' Justice Rehnquist noted that a
trustee's abandonment of property does not constitute managing or operating the property so as to come within the confines of section 959(b).10 2 Justice Powell's reliance on the provision, therefore, was unfounded.
Justice Rehnquist stated that the dissent shared the majority's concern for
protecting the public from the dangers of toxic waste, and recognized the
possibility of a narrower exception to the power of abandonment. 0 3 He
concluded, however, that the majority opinion was contrary to the purpose
of the Code.I°4 In addition, the majority's opinion was contrary to the public interest, because the state was in a better position to protect the public
10 5
health and safety than a bankrupt company.
III.

CONCLUSION

As the first case to define the parameters of section 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, Midlantic concluded that the courts should read common law
restrictions on the power of abandonment into section 554(a). The Court
looked to the pre-Bankruptcy Code, judicially created power of abandonment to justify the holding. The majority stated that the cases of Ottenheimer, Chicago Rapid Transit, and Lewis Jones established clear and
tended to codify prior case law. The legislative history does refer, however, to the common
law concept of abandonment, which presumably encompasses only the idea of abandoning
worthless property. See H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 181, reprintedin 2
A. RESNICK

& E. WYPYSKI,

BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,

Doc. No. 22 (1979); see also Note, Cleaning Up, supra note 49, at 879-80.
98. 106 S. Ct. at 764-65, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 871-72; see supra notes 39-53 and accompanying

text.
99. 106 S. Ct. at 764-65, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 871-72.
100. Id. (Ottenheimer based on conflict between Bankruptcy Code and another federal statute rather than between Bankruptcy Code and state law; Chicago Rapid Transit merely af-

firmed authorization of abandonment, but did not address legitimacy of conditions that lower
court placed on abandonment; Lewis Jones is only a single bankruptcy court decision).
101. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
102. 106 S. Ct. at 766, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 873-74. Section 959(b) refers to operating the
property. Cf In re Adelphi Hosp. Corp., 579 F.2d 726, 729 n.6 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam)
(trustee not manager of operations when involved in liquidation under pre-Bankruptcy Code
liquidation proceedings).
103. 106 S. Ct. at 767, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 875. Such a narrow exception was suggested in the
amicus curiae brief submitted by the United States: abandonment may be restricted if the
property consists of a case of dynamite sitting on a furnace in a schoolhouse. Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 20.
104. 106 S. Ct. at 767, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 875. Forcing the trustee to expend funds to clean up
the property would in effect put the claim of the state ahead of the other creditors.
105. Id.
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prevailing exceptions on the right to abandon. The Court also supported its
position with the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code, and other case
law and statutes, such as the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. section
362. The majority appears to have searched for justifications for a socially
conscientious result.
The dissent saw Ottenheimer, Chicago Rapid Transit, and Lewis Jones as
factually distinguishable from Midlantic. The dissent also argued that the
cases did not establish well-recognized exceptions to the power to abandon
as the majority claimed. The dissent also contended that the majority's reliance upon legislative history was questionable because the history was sparse
and unclear. Justice Rehnquist further argued that the express exceptions in
section 362, the automatic stay provision, indicated that if Congress had intended to restrict section 554(a) similarly, it could have included similar express restrictions.
An analysis of the development of the abandonment power, the Bankruptcy Code provisions, and the relevant case law indicate that the dissenting opinion is stronger than the majority opinion. The likely result of
Midlantic will be a legislative amendment to section 554(a) expressly to allow abandonment of contaminated property and thus reconcile the section
with the Court's decision. If an amendment does not follow, however,
Midlantic will likely be construed as a narrow exception to the abandonment
power since the decision stretches the language of the Bankruptcy Code.

Sandra G. Soneff Redmond

